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Foreword
The Plant Rehabilitation and Industrial Development
Districts Law of 1974 permits local communities in the state
of Michigan to offer property tax abatements as in
ducements for industry to locate there. This legislation also
recognizes the fiscal interdependency between a municipality
and its school district as they both utilize the same tax base.
Whether the granting of a tax abatement impairs the financ
ing of local public education is a most difficult question,
however, because there are a number of complicating fac
tors.
Because the question of impairment is likely to grow in im
portance as financial pressures on both municipality and
school district increase, the Institute is reprinting this study,
which originally appeared as an article in Business Condi
tions in the Kalamazoo Area. In this study, Dr. Wendling
analyzes the interaction among the warranted and unwar
ranted awarding of tax abatements, the formula for school
operating aid from the state and alternate concepts of im
pairment. It is published with the hope that the analysis in
the paper will assist local policymakers to assess the
ramifications of their actions on other taxing units.
Facts and observations expressed in this paper are the sole
responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent
positions of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research.
E. Earl Wright
Director
Kalamazoo, Michigan
March 1981

Executive Summary
Any action that a municipal government takes that affects
either the size of the property tax base or the flow of
revenues from it is likely to affect the financing of local
public education. The framers of the Michigan legislation
permitting local communities to award tax abatements to
new industrial developments and renovations of existing
facilities recognized this interrelationship. They instructed
governmental units awarding abatements to determine
whether their action was "impairing the financial soundness
of a taxing unit" (Section 207.559, Compiled Laws of
Michigan). Local governments must carry out this fiduciary
responsibility, however, even though the issue is complicated
by (a) inconclusive evidence on the influence of tax
abatements on the behavior of business and (b) the lack of
an operational definition of impairment of financing local
public education.
Whether the ability of Michigan school districts to finance
local education has been adversely affected by the granting
of tax abatements depends on the property wealth of the
school district and on the state formula used to allocate
operating aid. Districts on formula for state aid and taxing at
a rate of $30 per $1,000 state equalized value (SEV) or less do
not experience a change in spending for education between
the granting or withholding of a tax abatement as long as
their tax effort remains the same. Based on the 1979-80 for
mula, spending could have varied between the abatement/no
abatement alternative for districts on formula that expended
a tax effort greater than 30 mills. Consequently, unwar
ranted use of tax abatements directly affected potential
spending or potential millage reductions in these districts. A
change in the formula for 1980-81 eliminated this possibility.
Districts off formula are most affected by the granting of tax
Vll

breaks. Exempted property represents foregone revenue
which is not compensated by the aid formula. Furthermore,
since the introduction of the gross revenue deduct of
categorical aid, which is not neutral across districts, those
districts barely off formula are likely to be affected relatively
more than those whose SEV per pupil is substantially above
the formula limit.
The long-run question of impairment hinges on the state
aid formula reflecting the increasing costs of public services.
If it does not, districts on formula will have no recourse but
to increase their tax effort to provide the same level of real
services, assuming no growth of the tax base. If a large pro
portion of the tax base is exempted from property tax
payments, increasing the tax millage on the nonexempt tax
base could lead to the out-migration of firms and residents
comprising the nonexempt base. Instead of real growth, the
effective tax base could decline and the financial soundness
of the taxing unit could be damaged. However, continued
reliance on the state aid formula to forestall impairment is a
poor substitute for a rational policy on the use of tax
abatements.
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I. Introduction
Local public school districts rely on property tax revenues
to finance their operations even more than cities and coun
ties do. Any action that other governmental units take that
affects either the size of the tax base or the flow of revenues
from it, is likely to affect the financing of local elementary
and secondary education. Whether an action damages the
local education financing structure is not inevitable,
however. For instance, it is frequently asserted, though the
empirical results are inconclusive, that the need for
municipalities to provide a broad range of noneducation
public services may crowd out education spending, the
municipal overburden problem. At issue here is whether two
tax programs that local communities in the state of Michigan
have used to generate increased local economic activity have
adversely affected the local financing of public elementary
and secondary education. 1
Both tax programs are designed to facilitate the ability of
Michigan communities to compete with communities in
other states for industrial and commercial developments.
The Plant Rehabilitation and Industrial Development
Districts Law of 1974 (PA-198) empowers local government
units to establish plant rehabilitation and industrial develop
ment districts and with state approval issue certificates which
exempt replacement facilities or new facilities from the
general property tax for up to a 12-year period and instead
subject it to an industrial facilities tax. For replacement
(restored, rehabilitated) facilities the industrial facilities tax
1. The Institute currently is involved in a conceptual study of local tax programs, their ef
fectiveness at generating growth of the tax base, community investment goals and the in
direct benefits and costs on industrial and commercial developments. A number of issues
that logically could be raised here are dealt with in that study in order to limit the length of
this discussion.

is imposed at the same rate as the property tax, but is applied
to the state equalized value of the obsolete facility in the tax
year preceding the certificate. For new facilities the in
dustrial facilities tax is calculated by applying one-half of the
local property tax to the state equalized value of the new
facility. Act 255 of the Public Acts of 1978 expanded the
creation of rehabilitation and development districts and the
issuance of tax exemption certificates to include commercial
property.
The potential impact of tax abatements on the financing
of local public education in the state of Michigan was
recognized in the framing of PA-198. It is stated that the
city, county, township or village "shall set forth a finding
and determination that the granting of the industrial
facilities exemption certificate . . . shall not have the effect
of substantially impeding the operation of the local govern
mental unit or impairing the financial soundness of a taxing
unit" (Section 207.559 Compiled Laws of Michigan). Since
school districts are the prime competitors for the property
tax dollar, conflicts have surfaced in some instances between
the district and the unit of government utilizing the tax pro
grams contending that the district©s ability to raise sufficient
revenues is being damaged by the granting of abatements.
This article is organized in the following order. Section II
is a discussion of the efficacy of tax abatements and alter
native operational definitions of "impairment." Also in
troduced are the concepts of inherent production technology
and fiscal capacity. Both the most recent and the current
state of Michigan operating aid for education formulae are
presented in Section III. Both are analyzed because the im
plications of each are different and, as a result, school
districts that may have contended that their ability to finance
education was being damaged may now view abatements as
less harmful. The converse also may hold. The implications
of each formula are demonstrated using hypothetical

districts. The specific situation for the nine school districts in
Kalamazoo County is analyzed in Section IV. Additional
considerations, including the issue of equity, are raised in
Section V and the conclusions are presented in the final sec
tion.
The focus of the paper is narrow. It concentrates on tax
abatements, operating aid formulae, spending levels and
changes in state equalized value (SEV). Factors that may be
related to the question of impairment, but are not addressed,
include (a) the other state funding formulae for schools and
(b) other tax issues such as Headlee. Furthermore, only scant
attention is paid to the potential service pressures on school
districts resulting from new industrial and commercial
developments, and declining enrollments.

II. What Constitutes Impairment?
Two major unknowns are associated with the question of
the impact of tax abatements on local education finance.
They are (a) the inconclusive evidence on the influence of tax
abatements on the location and/or retention of firms and
(b) the lack of an operational definition of impairment of
financing local education. Perhaps these unknowns also are
the basis of conflict that has emerged between those govern
mental units awarding tax abatements and the local school
district. Furthermore, in addition to the unknowns, both
parties to the conflict are facing similar cost pressures and
limits to raising revenues.
One purpose of local property tax exemptions can be to
alter the competitive position of a community relative to
others in order to attract or retain industry and commerce.
Many studies, however, have relegated local taxes to a
relatively unimportant role in influencing the location of in
dustry (Schmenner, 1980). Other studies have determined
that variations in local property taxes are a factor in the
selection of a community for relocating manufacturing and
wholesale establishments (Wasylenko, 1980). Because the
evidence is inconclusive, and in the absence of some other
agreed upon community goal for the use of tax abatements,
the affected taxing units are likely to criticize the awarding of
abatements as not being warranted.
Impair is the term used in PA-198, but there is no opera
tional definition of impairment as it relates to soundness of
the ability to finance local public education. Actions of local
governmental units are going to affect the local school
district. How much must they be affected before they are im
paired? Consequently, governmental units do not have a
guideline they can use to monitor the impact of their actions
on other taxing units.

The problem created by the lack of an operational defini
tion becomes more apparent as several possibilities are pro
posed. Consider the following definition: the financial
soundness of the local school district is not impaired by the
granting of tax abatements as long as the school district is
able to maintain the same spending level. This definition
would be convenient and measurable. However, it also leads
to the conclusion that impairment never takes place in the
short run because tax abatements do not reduce the existing
tax base. If the district maintains the same tax millage, it will
be able to maintain the same level of spending. Thus, this
definition is too simplistic in the short run and would suggest
that no guideline is necessary.
An alternative definition could be based on the notion of
adequacy of the spending level. If the district is able to spend
above a predetermined "adequate" level, impairment is not
an issue. It is, however, if granting tax abatements interferes
with attaining this level. Not only does this necessitate deter
mining what constitutes an adequate level, but it requires
computing this for each district given that special needs of
students and input prices of education resources factors af
fecting the adequacy level also vary. Furthermore, to give
the definition more than theoretical meaning, some districts
currently must be spending less than an adequate amount. It
also may raise questions about a state aid formula allowing
districts to spend less than an adequate level. Thus, although
the notion of adequacy may be part of a definition, it is not
operational standing alone.
A definition based on millage might be an option. This is
flawed because the relationship between a change in state
equalized value and a change in the tax millage is not clearcut, and may vary over the range of equalized values (the
property tax base). For instance, voters may choose to raise
millage as state equalized value (SEV) per pupil increases
over the range of relatively low values of SEV per pupil, but

to decrease millage as SEV per pupil increases beyond a cer
tain level. Given the way the operating aid formula in
Michigan is structured, which is discussed in the next section,
the only way a district "on formula" can spend more is to
raise the tax millage; an increase in the property tax base will
not lead to an increase in spending.
The school district can respond to an increase in SEV per
pupil by either decreasing, increasing or not changing the tax
millage. Because tax abatements affect the potential increase
in SEV per pupil, they also may affect the school district©s
choice of response regarding tax millage. To suggest that the
inability to decrease tax millage is an impairment, as oppos
ed to not being able to raise millage, requires a specific value
judgment. To suggest the opposite also requires a specific
value judgment. However, to suggest that both possibilities
constitute impairment renders the definition superfluous
because impairment of financial soundness would then be
determined to occur whenever an abatement is awarded.
None of the above definitions is satisfactory. Either it is
simplistic, arbitrary or subject to a series of qualifications.
Each one, however, may constitute one aspect of impair
ment. Another factor that may be incorporated is the ques
tion of potential spending. For instance, if the tax millage re
mains the same, how much could the district spend for
education in the absence of tax abatements relative to what it
could spend after they have been granted? This also is not
satisfactory as a single measure since it applies to only one
subset of districts. Consequently, all of these aspects will be
incorporated into the analysis of the short term impact of tax
abatements on the financing of local public education.
Finally, governmental units and school districts are facing
similar cost pressures and limits to raising revenues. Conse
quently, growth of the property tax base may be necessary
for the continued provision of a constant level of public ser-

vices. The technology inherent in the production of some
public services permits little improvement in productivity.
The outputs of these services tend to be measured by the
labor inputs and the potential to substitute capital for labor
is limited (Baumol, 1967). 2 Education is one example. The
output of education tends to be measured by the pupilteacher ratio which is really an input measure. Increasing this
ratio raises the output (number of students taught) of each
teacher, but the quality of instruction is defined as decreas
ing. Because quality constant productivity improvements are
very limited, the cost of providing these services will increase
through time as wages rise (Baumol; Spann, 1977). Without
growth of the property tax base, the same level of public ser
vices will consume a greater portion of the revenues.
Revenues, however, cannot be increased simply by raising
taxes on the existing base because the fiscal capacity of a
community©s businesses and residents is limited. Fiscal
capacity is the maximum amount of revenue attainable by
the taxing unit from its tax base and residents (Akin and
Auten, 1976). Stated differently, fiscal capacity is the max
imum tax liability that can be imposed without leading to the
net out-migration of businesses and residents. It tends to be a
function of the size of the property tax base (standardized
2. The actual constraint may not be in the technology of production, but in the technology
of measuring output, outcomes or quality. Attempts to arrive at single measures of quality
or quantity are dismissed as inadequate because schools have a variety of goals: teaching a
certain amount of academic skills, socializing students, creating appropriate attitudes
toward work and authority, and preparing students to enter the job market. A frequently
used single measure is the achievement test score. There has been considerable controversy
over its use, but it does provide a quantitative standard for the outcome and change in out
come. Breakthroughs are being made in the technology of measuring education outcomes
that may permit the development of productivity measures and the discarding of the pupilteacher ratio. Researchers are determining which characteristics of teachers, administrators
and schools lead to improvements in achievement for students with specific attributes and
home backgrounds. Examples include: (a) students whose achievement level initially was
relatively low demonstrated greater improvement with less experienced teachers (Summers
and Wolfe, 1977); (b) male teachers were more effective than females, with stronger impact
in math than in reading (Murnane, 1975); and (c) reading score improvement was greater
using the linguistic basal approach than other techniques (Summers, 1979).
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for residents or pupils), the base©s distribution among in
dustrial, commercial and residential sectors and the income
of residents. Thus, units of government will attempt to
generate growth of the tax base and to increase local
economic activity.

III. A General Analysis of the Michigan
Operating Aid Formula
The basic formula for distributing operating school aid in
Michigan is a combination of minimum level foundation and
district power equalizing plans. The details of the formula
have changed for the 1980-81 school year relative to what
they were for the 1979-80 school year. Both are presented
because each highlights different aspects of whether districts
have been harmed by the granting of tax abatements and
under what conditions. Mathematically, operating aid to the
district for each student enrolled (member) in the school
district is:
State Operating Aid Per Pupil = X + M(P-Pj)
where X is per pupil foundation level of the aid for
mula,
M is the number of mills of tax effort by the
district,
P is the power of each mill of tax effort
guaranteed by the state, and
Pj is the power of each mill of tax effort in the
particular school district.
The foundation is a fixed amount per pupil which serves as
the basis for the formula and is not dependent on local tax
effort. However, it is not a flat grant to each district irrespec
tive of property wealth since the power equalizing compo
nent can erase the foundation level of support. The district
power equalizing element attempts to compensate for dif
ferences in property tax bases across communities by
equalizing the revenue yield (power) of each unit of tax ef
fort (millage). The power of the tax effort indicates the
revenue generated from the property tax base by one mill of
tax effort.
11

Districts with relatively low levels of property wealth per
pupil receive relatively greater amounts of state operating aid
whereas districts above a certain level receive no operating
aid they are "off formula." The state share of operating
expenditures for local public education has been approx
imately 38 percent. Local district revenues provide approx
imately 56 percent of the operating funds and the federal
share is 6 percent.
The district power equalizing formula has a number of im
plications for those districts "on formula." First, once a
district©s voters select a tax millage, variations in SEV per
pupil will not result in a change in spending per pupil in that
district. Second, the only way a district on formula can
change the level of spending is to adjust its tax effort. Third,
this formula provides an incentive for a district to levy a
higher tax millage because the amount of state aid received
per pupil by the district is greater as the tax millage is increas
ed, holding all other things constant. Finally, an increase in
the number of students to be served by the school district,
assuming that SEV and tax millage remain the same, will
result in greater aid per pupil in addition to increased aid due
to the additional pupils.
These features can be clarified by referring to Table I,
which lists the level of state aid per student, local revenues
per student and spending per pupil (for operating purposes)
for districts whose SEV per pupil ranges from $20,000 to
$75,000. 3 The formula utilized is that for the 1979-80 school
year. During that school year, the foundation support was
$325 per student. The state equalized the revenue yield at
$43.00 for each tax mill levied up to 30 and at $21.50 for
each mill beyond 30. Districts that levied a tax of $30 per
3. The equalizing nature of the formula is demonstrated by the proportion of spending
derived from state aid decreasing from 62.85 percent to 7.12 percent as the SEV increases
from $20,000 to $50,000.
12

Table I
State Operating Aid, Local Revenues and Total Spending
per Pupil for the 1979-80 School Year
for Hypothetical School Districts in Michigan
State equalized
value per pupil
$20,000 ..........
25,000..........
30,000..........
35,000..........
40,000..........
43,000..........
45,000..........
50,000 ..........
53,833..........
55,000..........
60,000 ..........
65,000..........
70,000 ..........
75,000..........

State operating
aid per pupil
$1,015
865
715
565
415
325
265
115
0
0
0
0
0
0

NOTE: Based on the following assumptions:
Tax Rate = $30 per $1,000 SEVPP
Operating Aid Formula = $325 + .030($43,000 - SEVPPj)
Local Revenue =.030(SEVPPj)
SEVPP: = State equalized value per pupil in the i district

Local revenue
per pupil

Total spending
(operating) per pupil

Percent aid
of spending

$ 600
750
900
1,050
1,200
1,290
1,350
1,500
1,615
1,650
1,800
1,950
2,100
2,250

$1,615
1,615
1,615
1,615
1,615
1,615
1,615
1,615
1,615
1,650
1,800
1,950
2,100
2,250

62.85
53.56
44.27
34.98
25.70
20.12
16.41
7.12
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00

$1,000 of state equalized value the measure of the property
tax base and whose SEV per pupil was less than $53,833
received some state operating aid and were able to spend
$1,615 per child for operating purposes through the com
bination of state aid and local revenues. School districts with
SEV equal to $43,000 per pupil received state aid of $325 per
enrolled pupil.
Consider the first implication: assuming a specific tax
millage, variations in SEV per pupil simply alter the ratio of
state aid to local revenues in the composition of the level of
spending. Initially consider the district whose SEV per pupil
is $35,000. It is levying a millage of 30 mills per $1,000 of
SEV per pupil. Local revenue is $1,050 per pupil and state
aid is $565 per pupil. State aid per pupil is computed by add
ing $325 (the foundation level) and the product of the
millage times the difference between the state©s
"guaranteed" tax base ($43,000) and the local district©s tax
base, both of which are measured on a per pupil basis. Total
spending from these two sources is $1,615 per pupil. If SEV
per pupil decreases to $30,000 and the tax millage remains
the same, operating aid per pupil increases to $715, local
revenue decreases to $900 per pupil, but spending remains
constant. Aid as a percent of spending increases from 34.98
percent to 44.27 percent. Thus, once the voters of a district,
which is on formula, have selected a tax millage, variations
in SEV per pupil will not result in a change in spending per
pupil.
The second feature follows directly from the formula: ad
justments in the tax effort can change the base amount of
spending that the formula assures. If in the operating aid
formula listed at the bottom of the table, the lower millage
of .025 is substituted for .030, and the SEV per pupil is
$35,000, the level of spending will change. This district will
receive less, only $525 in operating aid ($325-I-$200), will
raise less, only $875 in local revenues, and will spend less,
14

only $1,400 per pupil. It has been determined from the
previous case that if the tax millage is 30 mills, the spend
ing level is $1,615. Thus, the only way a district on formula
can adjust its level of spending is to change its tax effort. The
incentive to level a greater millage follows directly from the
previous examples. Recall that if the tax millage is 25 mills
and SEV per pupil is $35,000, operating aid per pupil is $525
per pupil; but aid increases to $565 per pupil if the tax effort
is 30 mills.
Finally, consider the implication concerning an increase in
the number of students. Initially, assume that SEV is $40
million and that there are 1,000 pupils. SEV per pupil is
$40,000 and, given the conditions listed in Table I, operating
aid per pupil is $415. If 183 pupils are added to the member
ship roster, and SEV remains the same, the SEV per pupil of
the district decreases approximately to $35,000. Operating
aid increases to $565 per pupil for 1,183 pupils whereas
previously the district received $415 per pupil for 1,000
students. The converse holds if membership declines;
operating aid per pupil is reduced and is received for fewer
pupils.
Table I also will be used to analyze whether tax
abatements have impaired financing of local education.
Throughout this analysis two caveats hold. First, it is assum
ed that school districts are financially sound at the start of
the time period under consideration. Second, the findings
apply only to one time period, the current one. No attempt is
made in this section to determine what the long-run impact
of granting a tax abatement will be nor what is the
cumulative influence of all the abatements that have been
granted previously.
Initially consider a district with SEV equal to $35,000 per
pupil. It receives state aid of $565, generates $1,050 from
local revenues and spends $1,615 per pupil. Assume that a
15

new industrial development is contemplated that could add
$10,000 to SEV per pupil. If no abatement is granted and the
firm decides to go through with the project, SEV increases to
$45,000 per pupil, state aid per pupil decreases to $265, but
local revenue per pupil increases to $1,350. Total spending is
$1,615 per pupil. However, as an inducement, the local com
munity offers the firm contemplating the development an
abatement that establishes an industrial development district
and sets the taxable value at one-half of its equalized value.
The project then adds only $5,000 per pupil to the effective
SEV for the school district, SEV per pupil increases to
$40,000, state aid per pupil is $415, local revenue per pupil is
$1,200 and total spending is $1,615 per pupil. 4 Thus, in this
situation any increase in SEV is matched by a decline in state
aid, with the result that spending remains the same.
Next, consider the case of a district that is off formula,
i.e., its SEV per pupil is greater than $53,833. Assume that
its SEV is $55,000 per pupil, it is levying a tax of $30 per
$1,000 of SEV and that a firm is contemplating a develop
ment that would add $10,000 per pupil to SEV, $5,000 per
pupil if an abatement is granted. Using Table I again, if the
development takes place and no abatement is granted, SEV
increases to $65,000 per pupil and $1,950 of local revenues
per pupil are raised from the tax effort. Granting an abate
ment reduces the potential increase to $60,000 SEV per
pupil, which generates local revenues of $1,800 per pupil for
education. If the development does not take place, local
revenues raised per pupil remain at $1,650.

4. In fact, an industrial facilities tax is levied on the development. Proceeds from the tax
are turned over to the district in relation to its usual tax levy. The result is identical to an in
crease in SEV for school taxing purposes. These values are used only for analytical conve
nience. A project would have to have a state equalized value of $140 million in order to add
$10,000 per pupil in Kalamazoo. For Schoolcraft, the project would need to add $8.9
million to the state equalized value.

16

Granting a tax abatement has no impact in this time period
on the district "on formula." Assuming tax effort would not
have changed, spending remains the same. The district "off
formula" potentially could have increased spending by a
substantial amount if the abatement is not granted, the
development occurs and it maintains the same tax effort.
Conversely, if the abatement is the key factor, the district
could increase spending or reduce tax effort as a result of it
being awarded. Thus, although there does not appear to be a
conclusive argument for impairment, the importance of the
effectiveness of tax abatements in answering this question
becomes more evident.
The question of whether $1,615, the base amount, is an
adequate level of spending for operating purposes also is a
factor. If the base level is recognized as adequate to provide
a reasonable quality of education, then the issuance of an
abatement could not be considered to impair the ability to
finance education in this time period. If $1,615 is not an ade
quate level, then impairment becomes more of a reality
whenever an abatement is granted that does not meet an
agreed upon community goal. It could be argued that since
the state formula does not fully equalize millage above .030,
the state formula implicitly recognized $1,615 as an adequate
level of spending for operating purposes. However, since the
formula does not require a minimum effort of 30 mills, it
could be suggested that the state formula makes no state
ment about minimum or adequate levels of spending.
A new industrial or commercial development also has im
plications for the supply of public services. The investment
may lead to the in-migration of households with additional
children that need to be served by the public schools. The
resulting cost pressures could vary among school districts.
For instance, school districts with excess capacity due to
declining enrollments may be able to operate more efficiently
with additional pupils. Although total cost will increase, the
17

average cost of each student may drop in such a district.
Other districts that are operating at capacity may be strained
by an influx of students. Thus, although the state grants
operating aid for each student, the additional cost of serving
new students could vary markedly across districts.
An important feature of the 1979-80 operating aid for
mula is that the power of the tax effort was equalized fully
only to 30 mills. Millage above this level was equalized at
one-half the rate. Table II addresses the impairment issue for
districts whose tax effort was greater than 30 mills. Consider
the district whose SEV per pupil is $30,000 and whose
millage is .040. As indicated in Table II, the district receives
$780 in aid, provides $1,200 of its own revenue for each
pupil and spends $1,980 per pupil. Assume the choice used
earlier: a development adding $10,000 to SEV per pupil with
no abatement or $5,000 to SEV per pupil with a tax abate
ment. Although the district is on formula, the outcomes dif
fer. Under the former case, aid is reduced to $430 per pupil,
local revenue increases to $1,600 and total spending per pupil
is $2,030. If a tax abatement is granted, state aid is relatively
greater, local revenue is relatively less, but total spending per
child is $2,005, which is less than in the no abatement situa
tion. Thus, districts exerting a tax effort greater than 30 mills
are affected by the granting of abatements because the dif
ference between the abatement/no abatement action, assum
ing the development takes place, is not fully compensated.
Therefore, these districts have a greater interest in
abatements being offered only when they are the marginal
(critical) determinant. For districts off formula, the case is
analogous to the one discussed in relation to Table I.
According to PA-198 and PA-255, tax exemptions also
can be given to existing firms that revitalize and/or expand
existing structures to make them more viable economically.
Tax abatements in this instance freeze property taxes at their
pre-renovation level. Is there a differential impact when the
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Table II
State Operating Aid, Local Revenues and Total Spending
per Pupil for the 1979-80 School Year
for Hypothetical School Districts in Michigan

State equalized
value per pupil

State operating
aid per pupil

Local revenue
per pupil

Total spending
(operating) per pupil

Percent aid
of spending

$20,000 ..........
25,000..........
30,000 ..........
35,000..........
40,000 ..........
43,000..........
45,000..........
50,000 ..........
52,286..........
55,000..........
60,000 ..........
65,000..........
70,000 ..........
75,000..........

$1,130
955
780
605
430
325
255
80
0
0
0
0
0
0

$ 800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,720
1,800
2,000
2,091
2,200
2,400
2,600
2,800
3,000

$1,930
1,955
1,980
2,005
2,030
2,045
2,055
2,080
2,091
2,200
2,400
2,600
2,800
3,000

58.55
48.85
39.39
30.17
21.18
15.89
12.41
3.85
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00

NOTE: Based on the following assumptions:
Tax Rate = $40 per $1,000 SEVPP
Operating Aid Formula = $325 + .030($43,000 - SEVPPj) + (.050)(.010)($43,000 - SEVPPj)
Local Revenue =.040(SEVPPj)
SEVPPj = State equalized value per pupil in the ith district

major thrust of tax policy is toward existing structures? For
purposes of discussion, assume that a community establishes
a rehabilitation zone in the central city and all rehabilitations
in that area automatically qualify for a tax abatement. Fur
thermore, assume that the district is taxing itself at a rate of
$40per$l,OOOSEV.
From Table II it can be seen that this case differs
somewhat from the one in which there is a new development.
Assume that the district is at $30,000 SEV per pupil and that
planned rehabilitations could raise it to $40,000. Instead, all
planned rehabilitations receive tax abatements which freeze
the effective tax base for school districts at the previous
level. Although state aid does not decrease to $430 from $780
per pupil, total spending does not increase either. What is
missing is that halfway point: the district gets no loaf instead
of a half loaf. However, the service pressure on the school
district is likely to be less than in the new development case
because the potential for families moving in and, therefore,
additional school age children needing to be served, pro
bably is much less.
The state of Michigan has altered its school operating aid
formula for the 1980-81 school year. Two major changes
have been made. First, the formula fully equalizes the power
of the tax effort for every mill levied, including those over
30. Second, if the district©s SEV per pupil is greater than the
no aid level, $58,133, the district incurs a reduction in
categorical aid received under a number of other programs. 5
Thus, a link has been established between the operating aid
and categorical aid formulae. The excess local revenue,
which is called the gross revenue deduct, is used to calculate
the amount that is deducted from the district©s receipts for
5. Categorical aid refers to state aid that is designated for specific categories of programs or
recipients. Examples could include aid for vocational education, special education, and, in
some instances, transportation. This differs from operating aid which can be used as the
district wishes for any operational purposes.
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several categorical aid programs, but the reduction is not
greater than 50 percent of the total categorical aid received
through these programs. Other changes to the formula in
clude increasing (a) the foundation aid to $357 per pupil and
(b) the power of each tax mill to $46.24 per pupil. As a
result, the base figure expenditure per pupil, assuming a
millage of .030, has risen to $1,744.20, compared to $1,615
under the prior formula.
The operation of the gross revenue deduct is displayed in
Table III. Consider the district whose SEV per pupil is
$60,000. At a millage of .030, $1,800 per pupil is raised local
ly. Given that the base spending figure is $1,744.20, the
potential revenue deduct is $55.80 per pupil. If the district
receives $200 per pupil in categorical aid under the applicable
programs, aid under these categoricals can be reduced by the
full amount of the revenue deduct, $55.80 per pupil.
However, if the district©s SEV per pupil is $70,000, yielding
revenue of $2,100 per pupil or $355.80 above the base
amount, the categorical aid of $200 is reduced (recaptured)
by only $100 per pupil. The reduction may not exceed 50 per
cent of the affected categorical aid. It should be noted that
the $200 per pupil example used here for categorical aid may
not bear any relation to the actual aid amounts received for
these programs. 6

6. The use of per pupil figures to reflect the potential recapture of categorical aid
understates the magnitude of the effect. For example, a district with 3,000 students and a
gross revenue deduct of $55.80 per pupil would lose over $167,000 in categorical aid. Fur
thermore, the local district involvement in categorical programs may vary according to the
size of the district. Larger districts may have a sufficient number of pupils in the special
programs to make it feasible to run their own programs rather than through the in
termediate districts. Thus, a larger district may spend proportionately more of its own
funds for its own program than a smaller district even though they have the same SEV per
pupil. Given that state aid to these programs has been approximately $.30 of each dollar,
the recapture results in larger districts spending proportionately a still greater amount on
these programs than smaller districts. Thus, the impact may not be neutral across districts
of equal SEV per pupil.
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Table III
State Aid for Education and Local Revenue Given the Operating Aid Formula
for the 1980-81 School Year for Hypothetical School Districts in Michigan
State equalized
value per
pupil
$20,000 ...........

N>

25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
46,240
50,000
55,000
58,133
60,000
65,000
70.000

...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........

State
operating
aid per
pupil
$1,144.20
994.20
844.20
694.20
544.20
394.20
357.00
244.20
94.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

o.oo

Local
revenue
per pupil
$ 600
750
900
,050
,200
,350
,387.20
,500
,650
,744
,800
,950

;1. 100

Total
spending
(operating)
per pupil
$ ,744.20
,744.20
,744.20
,744.20
,744.20
,744.20
,744.20
,744.20
,744.20
,744.20
,800.00
,950.00
;> 100.00

Percent
aid of
spending
65.60
57.00
48.40
39.80
31.20
22.60
20.47
14.00
5.40
.00
.00
.00
.00

Categorical
aid per
pupil
$200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200

NOTE: Based on the following assumptions:
Tax Rate = $30 per $1,000 SEVPP
Operating Aid Formula = $357+ (.030)($46,240 - SEVPPj)
Gross Revenue Deduct (GRD) = If SEVPPj>$58,333, then GRD = (0.30)(SEVPP; - $58,333) }(.50)(CA)
SEVPPj = State equalized value per pupil in the i district
CA = Categorical Aid

Revenue
deduct
per pupil
0
$
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
55.80
205.80
355.80

Aid
recaptured
by state
per pupil
0
$
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
55.80
100.00
100.00

What is the impact of local tax abatement programs on the
disbursement of state aid in accordance with the new for
mula? Referring back to Table III, consider the district
whose SEV per pupil is $55,000 and levies a tax millage of
.030. Total spending per pupil is $1,744.20, including $94.20
in state aid. Assume that a new development is considering
locating in the community that will raise the SEV to $65,000
per pupil if no abatement is granted or to $60,000 with a tax
abatement. In either case the district will go off formula, but
it now will be liable for a revenue deduct against the
categorical aid. If no abatement is granted, and the tax effort
does not change, local revenues will increase to $1,950 per
pupil but the district loses half its categorical aid, the reduc
tion amounting to $100 per pupil. Assuming that $100 of
operating revenues per pupil goes to make up the loss in
categorical aid, effective spending is $1,850 per pupil. If the
tax abatement is granted, the categorical aid reduction of
$55.80 per pupil will reduce effective local spending per pupil
to $1,744.20, the same as the base figure. Thus, even though
the abatement will increase the tax base, spending per pupil
will not change.
The district described above one that is almost off for
mula faces an unusual alternative: no increase in the tax
power if the abatement is the marginal determinant to a
potential development and it is not granted; no increase if
the abatement is granted; and a considerable increase in the
power of the tax effort if no abatement is granted and it is
not the marginal determinant. Districts with relatively
greater property wealth still face the earlier no loaf, half
loaf, full loaf alternative because of the constraint placed on
the amount of the aid recapture.
Districts whose property wealth (SEV) per pupil is less
than $58,133 per pupil could be relatively indifferent be
tween the granting or not granting of a tax abatement
because any gain in the tax base is matched by a loss in state
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aid, irrespective of the millage levied. This differs from the
previous formula in which districts levying a millage above
.030 were not fully equalized and therefore, directly affected
by the awarding of abatements in nonmarginal situations.
Those districts facing the biggest dilemma given the new for
mula are those just off formula. Although they are still
guaranteed the base amount, they are not made relatively
better off by additions to the tax base, whereas those
substantially above that level find that they can benefit from
either a small or large addition to SEV. Thus, the administra
tion of local tax policy by the municipality is likely to be
most controversial and difficult when the local school
district is just off formula.
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IV. The Situation for Kalamazoo
County School Districts
School districts in Kalamazoo County cover the range of
hypothetical possibilities discussed in the previous section.
For the 1979-80 school year, four of the nine districts levied
an operating millage over 30 mills, three levied a millage
substantially below 30 mills, one©s millage was approximate
ly 30 mills and only one of the districts was off formula. In
1980-81 again, only one district is off formula. The millage
levied for operating purposes ranges from 24.93 to 36.30
mills. The data for school districts in Kalamazoo County are
presented in Table IV. 7
The three hypothetical cases discussed earlier can be
classified as (a) districts on formula, (b) districts off formula
and (c) districts on formula whose tax levy is not fully
equalized. The granting of tax abatements affects each set of
districts differently.
The districts of Climax-Scotts, Galesburg-Augusta, Gull
Lake, Schoolcraft and Vicksburg in 1979-80 all were on for
mula and for the 1979-80 school year levied a millage of 30
mills or less. Therefore, in that time period, abatements that
added only one-half of the increase in SEV to the property
tax were fully equalized and spending for operating purposes
was not affected. These districts also are on formula for the
1980-81 school year and again the new operating aid formula
equalizes for the "lost" SEV.
The Comstock school district is the only one that is off the
operating aid formula. Its SEV per pupil exceeds the 1980-81
7. The data presented in Table IV have been collected from the local school districts. The
same set of data also was gathered from the Michigan Department of Education. In almost
all cases there is some discrepancy between the data from the two sources and, as a result,
this table may not be identical to one developed from state published sources.
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Table IV
Data on Financing for School Districts Located in Kalamazoo County

School district

^
<^

Climax-Scotts ..
Comstock......
GalesburgAugusta.....
Gull Lake ......
Kalamazoo City.
Parchment.....
Portage........
Schoolcraft.....
Vicksburg ......

Number of students
1980-1981
1979-1980

Operating millage
1980-1981
1979-1980

State Equalized Value
1979-1980
1980-1981

State Equalized Value
per student
1980-1981
1979-1980

22.0584
30.5500

29.5000
30.5500

5 27,292,359
164,547,307

$ 29,796,033
178,418,879

$34,680
59,901

$39,675
65,403

28.6128
1,412 2
1,438©
24.75003
2,758
2,812
36.1000
13,758
14,181
31.2588
1,909
1,987
31.8600
8,794
9,194
29.9960
892
890
2,782_____2,686____25.5491

28.8160
24.9300
36.3000
31.25884
32.2000
29.3000
30.0000

40,649,687
111,819,427
661,127,781
69,716,881
362,932,261
36,877,567
97,782,655

46,835,096
130,621,362
716,028,940
77,591,974
415,600,604
41,237,616
111,456,779

28,268
39,765
46,621
35,087
39,475
41,435
35,148

33,169
47,361
52,045
40,645
47,260
46,231
41,495

787
2,747

751
2,728

SOURCE: Contacts with the offices of school districts involved.
1. Includes 50 in adult education.
2. Includes 66 in adult education.
3. 23.9400 levied.
4. 31.9 authorized.

no aid level, which is $58,133, by a relatively small amount.
Therefore, it is the only district in the county subject to the
gross revenue deduct. In 1980-81 the district©s tax levy raises
$1,998 per pupil for operating purposes. This value,
however, is not equivalent to total spending per pupil
because federal and state categorical aids still provide some
support to the district.
The expected dollar loss in categorical aid for 1980-81 is
not available at this time. Proxy figures for 1978-79 are
available which indicate that the district spent $131 per pupil
for "added/needed" programs and in this same year they
received $109 per pupil from state sources. For purposes of
discussion, assume that for 1980-81 the Comstock district
was again scheduled to receive $109 per pupil in categorical
aid. The excess revenue generated given the millage and SEV
is $228 per pupil, of which $54.50 per pupil is subject to
recapture. Therefore, additions to the SEV will not lead to a
greater gross revenue deduct. Thus, this change to the
method of financing schools should have no appreciable im
pact on the deliberations on whether to grant tax abatements
in Comstock.
The districts of Kalamazoo, Parchment and Portage have
been affected most by the change in the operating aid for
mula between the 1979-80 and 1980-81 school years. These
districts have levied millage in excess of 30 mills and, as a
result, during the 1979-80 school year spending for operating
purposes could have differed depending on the decision to
grant or not to grant an abatement. This was the case
because mills in excess of 30 were equalized at one-half the
power. Therefore, although these districts© financial sound
ness in this time period probably was not impaired,
abatements granted that were not the marginal consideration
or did not further some other community goal, affected the
potential spending or tax millage of these districts.
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The 1980-81 operating aid formula altered the equaliza
tion of tax millage above 30 mills, thereby removing this
source of potential conflict. Therefore, if the criterion is
used that, in the current time period, the ability to finance
education has not been impaired if there is no difference in
spending between the abatement/no abatement situations,
eight of the nine districts have not been impaired. The one
district that falls outside this criterion, Comstock, is off for
mula, which implies that it has greater capacity than
necessary to finance education, assuming other factors are
the same.

28

V. Other Considerations
Perhaps the most troublesome issue is the long run impair
ment of financing local education. Suppose the base amount
per pupil is adequate in the current time period, but that the
state aid formula does not keep pace with the increase in
costs due to no productivity growth in future years. Districts
will have no recourse but to increase their tax effort in order
to finance the same level of real services in the future, assum
ing no growth in the tax base. However, the increase in tax
will be borne primarily by residents and firms not having any
property exempted. In turn, higher millage rates could cause
some out-migration of firms and residents, thereby exacer
bating the situation. Districts off formula must continue to
rely on growth of the tax base or increased tax rates to pro
vide the necessary revenues. The decision alternatives have
not changed for units of government making abatement
decisions in off-formula districts since they have not been
able to rely on the formula to compensate for the potential
revenues. The full impact of decisions has not been
mitigated.
Earlier the concept of fiscal capacity was discussed. Fiscal
capacity is the maximum revenue that can be generated by
the local community from its tax base without inducing outmigration. The district power equalizing formula is designed
to equalize for fiscal capacity differences. However, it is bas
ed on districts making the same tax effort, independent of
the SEV. For example, if the maximum local tax effort that
does not overburden the taxpayer is directly related to the
property wealth per pupil of the district, the impact of the
decision to grant a tax abatement differs among districts by
the SEV per pupil of the district. Suppose that the maximum
tax effort by a district with SEV per pupil of $20,000 is 20
mills, whereas it is 30 mills for a district with SEV per pupil
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of $30,000. Under the current formula the first district
would spend $1,281.80 per student and the second district
would spend $1,744.20. State operating aid would be
$881.80 and $844.20, respectively.
Assume the prospect of a development that would add
$10,000 to SEV per pupil in the first district. The usual com
parison would indicate that spending would remain at
$1,281.80, but the share of state aid would decrease. If the
new development increases incomes and leads to the inmigration of people having a greater taste for education, it is
possible that the tax effort would increase, say to 30 mills.
Total spending per pupil would then increase to $1,744.20.
Thus, the district would not be indifferent between the alter
natives. However, it is possible that local effort could
decrease with an increase in wealth since a desired (target)
level of spending could be reached with a lower millage. As
indicated earlier, neither case can be considered an "impair
ment" because any decision rule based on millage, in the
short run, requires a normative judgment.
Kleine (1979) stated that units of government granting tax
abatements were distributed unevenly through the state.
Specifically, PA-198 had a higher rate of usage in
Southwestern Michigan than elsewhere. Since a tax abate
ment usually results in greater operating aid for a school
district than would occur in the absence of an abatement,
assuming it is not the marginal determinant, and since state
operating aid tends to come out of general funds collected
throughout the state, communities granting abatements may
be receiving an implicit subsidy from the rest of the state.
Finally, equity also is a consideration. With respect to the
public education of children, one notion of equity suggests
that children should be treated equally, but it recognizes that
some pupils require additional services. One method of
measuring the equity of education is to examine spending
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patterns. Approximately equal spending is an indication of
equity, except that greater spending is required to compen
sate for differences in the needs of students or the prices of
education resources. Thus, if this notion of equity is ac
cepted, the analysis of whether a district©s ability to finance
services has been impaired must consider more than the level
of spending. It is possible that although two districts spend
approximately the same amount per pupil and have approx
imately equal SEV per pupil above the no aid level, a situa
tion that promises no growth of the effective tax base may
represent an impairment to the district that has many
students requiring special services.
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VI. Conclusions
Has the ability of Michigan school districts to finance
local education been adversely affected by the granting of
tax abatements for industrial and commercial projects ac
cording to either PA-198 or PA-255? The answer differs by
school district and through time depending on the state for
mula used to allocate operating aid. Analysis of this issue is
difficult, however, because (a) the evidence on the effec
tiveness of tax abatements at inducing growth of the tax base
is inconclusive and (b) there is no operational definition of
impairment of the financial soundness.
According to the analysis, districts on formula for state
aid and taxing at a rate of $30 per $1,000 SEV or less do not
experience a change in spending for education between the
granting or withholding of a tax abatement. This holds as
long as there is no relationship between tax effort and SEV,
i.e., their tax effort remains the same. Based on the 1979-80
formula, spending did vary between the abatement/no
abatement alternative for districts on formula that expended
a tax effort greater than 30 mills. Potential spending per
pupil was greater with a "full loaf" rather than with a "half
loaf" even though both led to greater spending than "no
loaf." Consequently, unwarranted use of tax abatements
directly affected potential spending or potential millage
reductions in these districts. A change in the formula for
1980-81 eliminated that possibility. Districts off formula are
most affected, although not necessarily impaired, by the
granting of tax breaks. Exempted property represents
foregone revenue; but with the gross revenue deduct ap
plicable to categorical aid in the current year, the impact is
not neutral across districts. Districts barely off formula are
likely to be affected relatively more than districts whose SEV
per pupil is substantially above the formula limit.
33

It does not appear that, in the present time period, tax
abatements have impaired the financial soundness of most
school districts. This conclusion is based on the assumption
that school districts are financially sound at the start of the
time period. No attempt is made to look at the cumulative
impact of previous abatements. In the long run, the question
of impairment hinges on the state aid formula reflecting the
increasing costs of public services. If it does not, districts on
formula will have no recourse but to increase their tax effort
to provide the same level of real services, assuming no
growth of the tax base. Exempting a large share of the tax
base from property tax payments could lead to the increased
tax effort exceeding the fiscal capacity of the nonexempt tax
base, which in turn would be manifested by the outmigration of firms and residents. Instead of real growth, the
effective tax base would decline and the financial soundness
would be adversely impacted. However, continued reliance
on the state aid formula to forestall impairment is a poor
substitute for a rational policy on the use of tax exemptions.
Districts off formula are a separate issue. When districts
on formula are able to provide only the base amount for
operating purposes, it is difficult to conceive that districts
off formula (by a significant margin) have had their ability
to provide education services damaged by tax abatements.
However, the new state aid operating formula with the
recapture of categorical aid will place a greater burden on
these districts such that impairment may become an issue if
tax exemptions are granted when not warranted.
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